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I 
96 PEOPLE V. J AOXSON [67 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 8910. In Bank. July 25, 1967.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAWRENCE 
AKIN JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant. 
[la, Ib] Criminal Law-Judgment-Collateral Attack: Review-
Confessions and Admissions.-In a prosecution for murder, in 
which, nearly a year before Escobedo was decided, the avail-
ability of appeal to the Supreme Court was exhausted and no 
certiorari was sought, the scope of the retrial (and appeals 
therefrom) on the issue of penalty, such retrial arising from 
defendant's petition for habeas corpus and a reversal under 
the retroactive application of Morse, was a matter of state 
procedure under which the original judgment on the issue of 
guilt remained final and invulnerable to attack on the basis of 
Escobedo. 
. [2] Id.-Judgment-Collateral Attack-Finality of Judgment.-
A judgment becomes final when all avenues of direct review 
are exhausted. 
[3a, 3b] Id.-Judgment-Collateral Attack: Review-Confessions 
and Admissions: Habeas Corpus-As Substitute for Appea.l.-
The issue of the alleged general involuntariness of an ac-
cused's extrajudicial statements, unrelated to Escobedo, could 
not, as to the issue of guilt, be raised for the first time on 
appe&l from the judgment against him on retrial of the penal-
ty phase (such retrial arising from a habeas corpus petition 
and reversal under a retroactive application of Morse), where 
the issue of voluntariness had been considered in the original 
trial in a full and fair hearing, and where the accused offered 
no explanation for his failure to raise such issue either on his 
initial unsuccessful appeal or in his habeas corpus petition, 
which was filed after any further availability of appeal and 
certiorari was exhausted. 
[4] Habeas Corpus-As Substitute for Appeal.-An issue which is 
raised in a criminal trial, and upon which conflicting testi-
mony develops, cannot serve as a basis for habeas corpus; 
piecemeal presentation or split adjudication of such issues can-
not be sanctioned. 
[3] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 11; Am.Jur., Habeas Cor-
pus (1st ed § 19). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 1019, 1254.5; [2] 
Criminal Law, § 1019; [3] Criminal Law, §§ 1019, 1254.5; Habeas 
Corpus, § 12(1); [4, 5] Habeas Corpus, § 12; [6] Criminal Law, 
§ 1382.1(14) ; Homicide, § 262. 
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[6] Id.-As Substitute for Appeal.-An accused's failure to exer-
cise his readily available remedies of trial and appeal to secure 
his federal constitutional rights will ordinarily constitute such 
a deliberate bypassing of orderly state procedures as to justify 
denial of federal as well as state collateral relief. 
[6] Criminal Law - Appeal- Reversible Error - Testimony Im-
pelled by Erroneous Admission of Extrajudicial Statements: 
Bomicide-Error.-In a prosecution for murder, initially tried 
before the effective date of Escobedo-Dorado, it was reversible 
error on retrial of the penalty phase after such date, to admit 
defendant's prior trial testimony, where such testimony had to 
be deemed to have been a product of the admission of extra-
judicial statements taken in violation of Escobedo-Dorado, and 
where, under the Ohapman test, it could not be said beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of River-
side County. Leo A. Deegan, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment imposing death penalty 
reversed and the cause remanded for retrial on the issue of 
I 
penalty only. i 
Gladys Towles Root, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, and Richard L. Brand for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Jack E. Goertzen, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
, 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-A judgment convicting defendant of 
mst degree murder and sentencing him to death was affirmed 
on appeal. (People v. Jackson (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 375 [29 Cal. 
Rptr. 505, 379 P.2d 937].) Thereafter, because of errors con-
demned in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631 [36 Cal. 
Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810], we issued a writ of 
habeas corpus and reversed the judgment insofar as it related 
to penalty. (I'll re Jackson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 500 [39 Cal.Rptr. 
220, 393 P.2d 420].) Upon retrial, defendant waived a jury 
trial, and the court fixed the penalty at death. This appeal is 
automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 623; Am.Jur.2d,Appeal 
and Error, § 797 et seq. 
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The essential facts are set forth in our former opinion and 
need not be repeated. (People v. Jackson, supra, 59 Cal.2d 
375.) 
By stipulation the evidence at the penalty retrial consisted 
of the transcripts of the trial on the issue of guilt and the 
first trial on the issue of penalty, subject to objections and 
further testimony. The trial court assumed that EscobeM v . 
. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977,84 8.Ct. 1758], 
applied and deleted from the transcript all of defendant's 
extrajudicial admissions and all questions and answers of 
defendant on cross-examination that related to his interroga-
tion. The court, however, did not delete defendant's other 
testimony that included seriously damaging admissions. 
[1a] Defendant contends that statements inadmissible 
under EscobeM v. Illinois, supra, 378 U.S. 478, and People v. 
Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 
361], were introduced into evidence at his trial on the issue of 
guilt and that both judgments should therefore be reversed. 
We do not reach the question of the admissibility of 
defendant's statements under Escobedo and Dorado at the 
trial on the issue of guilt. A judgment that became final· 
before June 22, 1964, the date on which the Supreme Court 
decided the EscobeM case, cannot be attacked on the basis of 
that case. (In re Shipp (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 547, 549 [43 Cal. 
Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571] ; In re Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 368, 372 
[42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380] ; see Johnson v. New Jersey 
(1966) 384 U.S. 719, 733 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 892, 86 S.Ct. 
1772] .) 
[2] A judgment becomes final when all avenues of direct 
review are exhausted. (People v. Ketchel (1966) 63 Cal.2d 
859, 863-865 [48 Cal.Rptr. 614, 409 P.2d 694] ; In re Spencer 
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 405 [46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33] ; see 
Tehan v. Shott (1966) 382 U.S. 406,409 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 455, 
86 8.Ct. 459] ; Linkletter v. Walker (1965) 381 U.S. 618, 622 
[14 L.Ed.2d 601, 604, 85 8.Ct. 1731].) [1b] In the present 
case the availability of appeal in this court was exhausted on 
May 1, 1963, when defendant's petition for rehearing was 
denied (People v. Jackson, supra, 59 Ca1.2d 375, 381). He did 
not seek certiorari. Thus, almost a year before Escobedo was 
decided, defendant had exhausted all remedies for direct 
review of the original proceedings determining his guilt and 
the penalty. Thereafter this court granted defendant's peti-
tion for habeas corpus and reversed the judgment only on the 
issue of penalty, thereby affording a collateral remedy for a 
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'etrospective application of People v. Morse, supra, 60 Ca1.2d 
i31. The scope of this retrial is a matter of state procedure 
mder which the original judgment on the issue of guilt 
'emains final during the retrial of the penalty issue and 
luring all appellate proceedings reviewing the trial court's 
lecision on that issue. (See In re Gaines (1965) 63 Cal.2d 234 
[45 Cal.Rptr. 865, 404 P.2d 473]; In re Lopez, supra, 62 
0a1.2d 368, 370.) 
[Sa] Defendant also attacks the judgment on the issue of 
~uilt on the ground that his extrajudicial statements were 
.nvoluntary even if Escobedo does not apply. (See Johnson v. 
N' ew Jersey, supra, 384 U.S. 719, 730 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 890].) 
He contends that he was given no warnings, that his request 
to consult with counsel was ignored, that he was allowed to 
see his mother and aunt in return for a promise to confess, 
and that he was urged to confess by the district attorney who 
purported to be advising him. . 
The trial court in the original trial considered the issue of 
voluntariness in a full and fair hearing. It heard substantial 
evidence, including defendant's testimony, that his state-
ments were voluntary, and it admitted them into evidence 
over objection. Neither on his appeal (People v. Jackson, 
supra, 59 Ca1.2d 375, 377) nor· in his petition for habeas 
corpus (I'll. re Jackson, supra, 61 Ca1.2d 500) did defendant 
challenge the voluntariness of his statements. 
On this appeal from the judgment on the issue of penalty, 
the attack on the judgment on the issue of guilt is governed 
by the rules applicable to a collateral attack. (People v. Polk 
(1965) 6:t Ca1.2d 443, 448 [47 Cal.Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641].) 
[4] "We have consistently held that an issue which is raised 
in the trial court, and upon which conflicting testimony 
develops, cannot serve as a basis for habeas corpus; we cannot 
sanction piecemeal presentation or split adjudication of such 
issues .... " (In re Shipp, supra, 62 Ca1.2d 547, 552, cert. 
den. (1966) 382 U.S. 1012 [15 L.Ed.2d 528, 86 S.Ct. 623].) 
[5] Moreover, failure to exercise" readily available remedies 
will ordinarily constitute such a deliberate bypassing of 
orderly state procedures as to justify denial of federal as well 
as state collateral relief." (In re Sterling (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 
486,489 [47 Cal.Rptr. 205, 407 P.2d 5] ; In re Shipp, supra, 
62 Cal.2d 547, 554-555; Pen. Code, § 1475.)1 [3b] Defend-
lSee Fay v. Now (1963) 372 U.S. 391, 438 [9 L.Ed.2d 837, 869, 83 S.Ct. 
822]; Sanders v. United States (1963) 373 U.S. I, 17-18 [10 L.Ed.2d 
148, 162-163, 83 S.Ct. 1068]; De Welles v. United States (7th Cir_ 1967) 
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ant offers no explanation for his failure to raise the issue 
whether his statements were voluntary at the prior proceed-
ings. Under these circumstances the issue may not now be 
raised. 
[6] 'Vith respect to the second trial on the issue of 
penalty, defendant contends that the court erred in not delet-
ing all of his testimony at the first trial. He correctly points 
out that such testimony must be deemed a product of the 
admission of his statements into evidence (People v. Spencer 
(1967) 66 Ca1.2d 158, 164-168 [57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 
715]) and that if those statements were inadmissible at his 
penalty retrial, his testimony was also inadmissible. 
Whether those statements were inadmissible turns on 
whether Escobedo and Dorado were applicable to defendant's 
penalty retrial, which began on October 16, 1964. Although 
defendant '08 conviction was final before June 22, 1964, when 
Escobedo was decided, his retrial on the issue of penalty 
occurred after that date. Under these circumstances we are 
persuaded that People v. Doherty (1967) ante, p.9 [59 Cal. 
Rptr. 857,429 P.2d 177], is controlling and that Escobedo and 
Dorado were therefore applicable. 
Defendant's extrajudicial statements were taken in viola-
tion of Escobedo and Dorado, and his testimony must be 
deemed a product of the admission of those statements. (Peo-
ple v. Spencer, supra, 66 Cal.2d 158, 168.) We cannot'say 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in admitting that 
testimony at the penalty retrial was harmless. (Ohapman v. 
Oalifornia (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 711, 87 
S.Ct.824].) 
The judgment imposing the death penalty is reversed and 
the cause remanded for retrial on the issue of penalty only. 
Tobriner, J., Burke, J., Sullivan, J., and White, J.,. 
concurred. 
PETERS, J.-Concurring and dissenting. 
I agree with the majority insofar as they reverse the judg-
372 F.2d 67, 68·69; Thornton v. United StateB, 368 F.2d 822, 825, 829; 
Campbell v. United StateB (7th Cir. 1966) 355 F.2d 394, 395; Nash v. 
United StateB (5th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 366, 368; Vena v. Warden, State 
PriBon (Conn. 1966) 225 A.2d 802; Dunek v. District Court 01 Lee 
COU71ty (Iowa 1966) 140 N.W.2d 372, 374; Brown v. Wingo (Ky. 1965) 
396 S.W.2d 785; Comonwealt1, v. Cavell (1967) 423 Pa. 597· [225 A.2d 
673]; 28 U.S.C.A. II 2244, 2254 (amended by 80 Stat. 1104 (1966». 
-Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign· 
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Councll. 
1 j 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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) 
July 1967] PEOPLE V. JACKSON 
[67 C.2d 96; 60 Cal.Rptr. 248, 429 P.2d 600] 
101 
ment imposing the death penalty. I dissent from that portion 
of the majority opinion that refuses to consider the impact of 
tIle errors on the issue of guilt. 
This case has been before us several times. On April 2, 19G:l, 
we affirmed the first degree murder judgment imposing the 
death penalty (People v. Jackson, 59 Cal.2d 375 [29 Cal.Rptr. 
505, 379 P.2d 937]). Thereafter, on July 6, 1964, on habeas 
corpus, a new penalty trial was ordered because of errors 
condemned in People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631 [36 Cal.Rptr. 
201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810]. The judgment was 
affirmed in all other respects (In re Jackson, 61 CaI.2d 500 
[39 Cal.Rptr. 220, 393 P.2d 420]). At the new penalty trial, a 
jury was waived, and again the death penalty was imposed. 
The present appeal is from that judgment and is automatic. 
(Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
The appellant contends that at both the original guilt trial 
and at the retrial of the penalty issue there were admitted 
into evidence admissions and a confession in violation of the 
rules established in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [12 
L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758]; and People v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 
338 [4~ Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P .2d 361], and that such errors 
were highly prejudicial. 
The majority find that such errors occurred and require a 
reversal of the penalty issue, but also hold that such errors 
cannot be legally considered on the guilt issue. With this 
latter conclusion I disagree. . 
It is established law that judgments which become "final" 
prior to the date of Escobedo (June 22, 1964) may not be 
attacked on the basis of Escobedo or Dorado. (In re Lopez, 62 
Cal.2d 368, 372 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380].) The rule 
defining finality for this purpose is stated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 
622, in footnote 5 [14 L.Ed.2d 601, 604, 85 8.Ct. 1731] : "By 
final we mean where the judgment of conviction was rendered, 
the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition 
for certiorari had elapsed .... " 
In the present case the availability of appeal was exhausted 
on May 1, 1963, when defendant's petition for rehearing was 
denied by this court (People v. Jackson, supra, 59 Ca1.2<l 375, 
381), and, since certiorari was not sought by defendant, the 
time for petitioning for certiorari elapsed 90 days thereafter.l 
lThe 90-day period runs from the date of filing of the opinion unless a 
timely petition for rehearing is filed, in which ease it runs from the date 
) 
102 PEOPLE V. JACKSON [67 C.2d 
Thus, under these rules, there can be no doubt that at one 
point the issue of guilt and the issue of penalty were both 
"final" befure Escobedo was decided. But we recalled the 
remittitur, at least 011 the penalty issue. This reopened the 
penalty issue and required a retrial of that issue, which 
occurred after Escobedo. The real question with which we are 
now concerned is whether that action had any effect on the 
guilt issue so far as certiorari is concerned. 
In several cases decided by tbis court we have apparently 
held that a determination of guilt is final for some purposes 
even though we reverse for a new penalty trial. We have held 
that if on the penalty retrial an attack is made on the guilt 
issue it is a collateral attack. (People v. Polk, 63 Cal.2d 443, 
447-448 [47 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641] ; cf. People v. Terry, 61 
Cal.2d 137, 151 [37 Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381]; People 
v. Love, 56.Ca1.2d 720,725 [16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.Rptr. 481, 
366 P.2d 33, 809].) But we are not concerned with these 
generalizations. We are concerned with what the United 
States Supreme Court considers as "final" for the purposes 
here involved. That court has determined that finality for 
such purposes depends on when the time for petitioning for . 
certiorari to that court lias elapsed. Thus, the question of 
whether' a reversal of the penalty issue also affected the 
finality of the jUdgment of guilt depends not upon our own 
definition of finality but upon whether the United States 
Supreme Court would treat the issue of guilt as reopened on a 
petition for certiorari properly filed from an affirmance after 
a penal ty retrial. 
There can be no doubt that affirmance of a judgment of 
guilt is considered a "final" judgment, so as to permit an 
immediate review by the United States Supreme Court, even 
though a new trial is ordered on the penalty issue. (Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85, fn. 1 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 217, 83 
8.Ct. 1194].) But this is not decisive. The high court has also 
held that, even though such a first review is possible on the 
issue of guilt, after a final determination of the penalty the 
issues involved on the guilt trial may be reviewed on the 
review of the penalty trial. This was the precise holding of 
Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169 [11 L.Ed.2d 229, 84 8.Ct. 
298], cited with approval by this court in People v. Ketchel, 
63 Cal.2d 859, 864 [48 Cal.Rptr. 614, 409 P.2d 694]. There 
of the denial of the petition for rehearing. (Market Street Ey. 00. V. 
Railroad Com., 324 U.S. 548, 550·552 [89 L.Eil. 1171, 1176·1177, 65 S.Ct. 
770].) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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defendant was sentenced twice for the same crime under a 
federal statute providing that an initial sentence may be ren-
dered until more detailed information as a basis for determin-
ing final sentence is available. Recognizing that certiorari was 
available 19 review the first sentence, the court held that as a 
practical matter, the severity of the final sentence imposed is 
often. a· major factor in deciding whether to appeal, and that 
defendant had the option of appealing from either sentence 
because Congress did not intend to subject a defendant to the 
burden of having to choose whether to appeal without first 
knowing Ilis punishment. The court stated that "Long-
accepted and conventional principles of federal appellate 
. procedure require recognition of the defendant's right to 
await the imposition of final sentence before seeking review of 
the conviction. That is the general rule." (Corey v. United 
States, supra, 375 U.S. at p. 176 [11 L.Ed.2d at p. 234].) 
. By this rule, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized the decisive importance of knowing what the final sen-
tence is before deciding whether to seek certiorari. Obviously 
the high court would not require one whose conviction is 
affirmed but the penalty reversed to choose once and for all 
right then whether to petition for certiorari on the guilt issue. 
In fact, it has been held in this state that where the issue of 
guilt is final but not the issue of penalty, the issue of guilt 
can be attacked on Escobed'O-Dorado grounds. (People v. 
Ketchel, supra, 63 Cat2d 859, 863-865.) In the present case 
the penalty judgment as well as the guilt judgment was 
"final" before Escobedo, so that the defendant knew his 
punishment at the time he was required to determine whether 
to petition for certiorari. He did not do so. But then, for 
proper reasons, we recalled the remittitur, and reopened the 
penalty issue. The present status of the case is the same as if 
we had ordered a new penalty trial on the first appeal. When 
we recalled our remittitur so as to reverse as to the penalty, 
the remittitur relating to the guilt trial was also necessarily 
recalled.2 It is quite significant that without passing directly 
on the issue, it has been our practice to again affirm the judg-
ment of guilt after reversing the penalty determination. ( In 
2When a remittitur is recalled the court does not "resume" jurisdic-
tion that was lost by the issuance of the remittitur after the first appeal. 
The theory is that because of the irregularity jurisdiction was never lost. 
Once recalled, the decision on the first al!peal is a nullity. (Isenberg v. 
Sherman, 214 Cal. 722, 726 [7 P.2d 1006J; Rowland v. Kreyenhagen, 24 
Cal. 52, 59.) 
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re J fU:,kson, supra, 61 Cal.2d 500, 508.) This would be 
meaningless if the guilt issue were not before us. 
Under both state and federal law a final judgment from 
which an appeal may be taken in a criminal case is the sen-
tence, that is, the judgment is the sentence. (Oorey v. United 
States, supra, 375 U.S. 169, 174 [11 L.Ed.2d 229, 233] ; People 
v. Sweeney, 55 Cal.2d 27, 33, fn. 1 [9 Cal.Rptr. 793, 357 P.2d 
1049].) This equation of the judgment with the sentence 
strongly suggests that when a sentence is reversed no matter 
when, the United States Supreme Court will deem the whole 
judgment, including the conviction, to be reopened for the 
purpose of direct attack by writ of certiorari. 
It follows, of course, that since the penalty determination is 
not yet final, defendant may attack the guilt trial on the 
ground that statements were admitted in violation of Esco-
bedo and Dorado.s Because the case on the guilt issue was 
tried before Escobedo, defendant's failure to object to the 
admission of his statements does not preclude him from rais-
ing the question on appeal. (People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 692, 
711 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382].) 
If the guilt trial is reopened by the granting of a new trial 
as to penalty, as I believe should be done, there can be no 
doubt' that evidence was admitted during the guilt trial that 
violated the principles of Escobedo and Dorado. The question 
of whether such errors were prejudicial should, in my opin-
ion, be reviewed on this appeal. That they were prejudicial 
seems to me clear beyond a possibility of a doubt. My reasons 
need not now be set forth in view of the majority's refusal to 
even consider the question of error. 
Thus, while I agree with the majority in the holding that 
the judgment insofar as it relates to penalty must be reversed, 
I disagree with the majority in holding that the propriety of 
the guilt determination should not also be reversed. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the jUdgment 
imposing the death penalty. 
SIt is true that in In re Lopez, supra, 62 Cal.2d 368, where' we reversed 
the penalty trial because of errors condemned in People v. Mor8e, 8upra, 
60 Ca1.2d 631, we held that the judgment of guilt may not be attacked on 
Escobedo-Dorado grounds because the guilt judgment had been affirmed 
prior to the decision in Escobe.do. Thus, factually, the problem involved 
bere was also there involvetl, hut the legal effect of the reversal as to 
penalty, the point here discussed, was not considered. It is elementary law 
that an opinion is not an authority for any proposition not considered in it. 
